Une théorie physicaliste de la conscience phénoménale = A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness = Una teoría fisicalista de la conciencia fenomenal
Manifestación
- Autores
- Identificador
- 860612
- Fecha de publicación
- 2011
- Forma obra
- Tesis
- Lugar de producción
- 2011
- Idioma
- inglés
- Nota de edición
- Digitalización realizada por la Biblioteca Virtual del Banco de la República (Colombia)
- Materias
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- Filosofía y Psicología; Filosofía y Psicología / Filosofía moderna occidental
- Notas
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- Colfuturo
- © Derechos reservados del autor
- This thesis advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which I label “ephysicalism”. It takes a realist stance towards subjective conscious experience: there are some entities such that there is something it is like, intrinsically, to be one of them (Nagel 1974). Firstly, I argue for a physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, I reject the thesis that consciousness is a supervenient property and, in particular, Strong AI and computational functionalism.
Thirdly, I reject HOT theories of consciousness, address the “unity of consciousness”, and discuss the “explanatory gap” (Levine 1983). Fourthly, I argue that consciousness is an emergent property of conscious entities: it is, with respect to the micro-constituents of the emergence base, an ontologically novel property with original causal powers. Fifthly, I criticise Chalmers' (1996) “zombie argument” and Kim's (2005) “supervenience argument”. Finally, I argue that phenomenal contents are physical properties, and discuss Jackson's (1982) “knowledge argument”. - Conciencia fenomenal; Filosofía de la ciencia; Filosofía de la mente; Fisicalismo; Metafísica; Problema mente-cuerpo
- Enlace permanente
- https://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra/une-theorie-physicaliste-de-la-conscience-phenomenale-a-physicalist-theory-of-phenomenal-consciousness-una-teoria-fisicalista-de-la-conciencia-fenomenal-860612
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